Folks,
If you’ve been wondering what, exactly, our plan was or is for the post-war
Iraq, and what’s the deal anyway with Iran, this may help a little. It’s a
detailed discussion of the US’ counterinsurgency strategy options in Iraq,
and explains how “the key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in
Iran.” If you’ve got the stomach for it (as the saying goes, if you like
politics or sausage, you don’t want to know what goes into them), it’s very
interesting stuff.
The core options according to this author are:
1. Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while
allowing the political situation on the ground to play itself
out. Allow the tension between Shiite and Sunni to explode into
civil war, manipulating each side to the U.S. advantage, while
focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria, Iran and
elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the
Iraqi reality, and carry on operations elsewhere.
2. Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through
counterinsurgency operations, including direct military attacks
and political operations.
Read it and weep.
–C
—–Original Message—–
From: owner-standard@mail2.stratfor.com
On Behalf Of Strategic Forecasting Alert
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2003 7:41 AM
To: standard@mail2.stratfor.com
Subject: Stratfor Weekly: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
7 July 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq
Summary
The appointment of Gen. John Abizaid as head of U.S. Central
Command opens a new phase in both the Iraq campaign and the war
on al Qaeda. In order to wage follow-on operations against al
Qaeda, an effective counterinsurgency operation must be launched
against the Iraqi guerrillas. This is a politico-military
imperative. Politically, the United States must demonstrate its
effectiveness against the full spectrum of opponents. Militarily,
the United States must show it can project forces from Iraq while
the base of operations remains insecure. Directly suppressing an
insurrection without indigenous support historically has been
difficult, but Iraq has a built-in opposition to the guerrillas:
the Shiites in the south. But their desire to dominate an Iraqi
government — and their ties to Iran — runs counter to U.S.
policy. This means Washington will have to make some difficult
choices in Iraq, and in the end will give away some things it
does not want to give away.
Analysis
U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially take over as head of
Central Command during the week of July 7. His mission will be
not only to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but also to command
the main U.S. offensive against al Qaeda. The summer offensive
that Stratfor has written about has begun, and Abizaid’s mission
will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into a
coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to further
undermine al Qaeda’s ability to strike at the U.S. homeland.
In war, no plan unfolds as expected. This war began in a
completely unexpected fashion on Sept. 11, 2001. As is
inevitable, the course of the war has taken unexpected turns. The
most recent and significant turn of this war has been the
emergence of a guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it
appears to us that in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the fighters on
the ground understood that they could not win a conventional war.
Rather than engage in the sort of conflict at which the United
States excels, they put up token conventional resistance, all the
while planning to engage the United States in unconventional
warfare over an extended period.
In other words, the Iraqi forces understood that they could not
defeat the United States in conventional war. Instead, the Iraqi
war plan consisted of declining conventional engagement and
subsequently engaging U.S. forces in operations in which their
advantages were minimized and their weaknesses were exposed.
This has left the United States with the following battle
problem: It must wage the broader summer offensive while
simultaneously containing, engaging and defeating the Iraqi
guerrillas. This is not an easy task, not only because it spreads
U.S. forces thinner than planned, but also because the challenge
posed by the guerrillas has trans-military implications,
politically and psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore these
considerations and must integrate them into his war plan. This is
neither easy nor optional.
It is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic
purpose of all of these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda
and potential follow-on groups to prevent further major attacks
on the United States. The Iraq campaign was an element in this
broader strategy, designed to achieve these three goals, in
increasing importance:
1. The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al
Qaeda operations.
2. The transformation of the psychological architecture of the
Islamic world. The perception in the Islamic world, developed
since the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by
events since then, was that the United States was incapable of
resolute action. The United States was seen as powerful
militarily, but as lacking the political will to use that power.
U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in Beirut
and Somalia. In Afghanistan, the United States halted operations
after seizing major cities, apparently because it was unwilling
to engage in more extended conflict. The U.S. invasion of Iraq
was designed to change the Islamic world’s perception –
accepting anger at the United States in exchange for greater
fear.
3. The creation of a base of operations that would allow the
United States to bring political and military pressure to bear on
a cluster of nations the U.S. administration sees as directly or
indirectly sustaining al Qaeda operations — in particular Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Iran. Riyadh began shifting its position prior
to the Iraq invasion. Immediately after the end of the campaign,
the United States turned its attention to follow-on operations
against Syria and Iran. These operations have been primarily
political since the end of the Iraq campaign, but the constant
threat exists that they could move to a military phase at any
point.
The guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second
objective of the Iraqi campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a
trans-military goal: It is rooted in a military operation but
ultimately arrives at an issue that transcends the purely
military — namely the psychological perception of the United
States and the credibility of U.S. military threats. As a
secondary matter, it also complicates the logistics of follow-on
operations after Iraq. At the moment, that is not the primary
issue — although it should be emphatically noted that an
evolution in the conditions in Iraq very well could undermine the
U.S. ability to use Iraq as a base of operations.
The problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted
in U.S. strategy. The United States invaded both countries as a
means toward other ends, rather than as ends in themselves. The
invasion of Afghanistan was intended to disrupt al Qaeda’s main
operational base. The invasion of Iraq was intended to bring U.S.
power to bear against al Qaeda’s enablers in the region. In
neither case did the United States have an intrinsic interest in
either country — including control of Iraq’s oil.
The United States could achieve its primary purpose in each
country without complete pacification. In Afghanistan, the U.S.
administration accepted from the beginning that the complex
tribal and ideological conflicts there would make pacification
impossible. U.S. forces seized the major cities and a few
strategic points, kept most forces in protected garrisons and
conducted military operations as opportunities to combat al Qaeda
arose. U.S. forces avoided any attempts at pacification projects,
understanding that the level of force and effort required to
achieve any degree of pacification far outstripped U.S. interests
and probably U.S. resources. The United States had a limited
mission in Afghanistan and ruthlessly focused on that, while
publicly professing ambitious and complex goals.
The Iraq campaign took its primary bearings from the Afghan
campaign. The goals were to shatter the Iraqi army and displace
the Iraqi regime. These goals were achieved quickly. The United
States then rapidly pivoted to use its psychological and military
advantage to pressure Syria and Iran. As in Afghanistan,
pacification was not a primary goal. Pacification was not
essential to carrying on the follow-on mission. But the U.S.
reading of the situation in Iraq diverged from that of
Afghanistan. The U.S. administration always understood that the
consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan would be the
continuation and intensification of the chaos that preceded that
invasion. The underlying assumption in Iraq was that the postwar
Iraqi impulse would be toward stability. The U.S. administration
assumed that the majority of the Iraqi public opposed Saddam
Hussein, would welcome the fall of his regime, would not object
to an American occupation and, therefore, would work harmoniously
with the United States in pacification projects, easing the
burden on the United States tremendously.
The U.S. administration expected the defeat of the Taliban to
devolve into guerrilla warfare. The United States did not expect
the defeat of the Baath regime to devolve into guerrilla warfare.
It did not expect the Shiites to be as well-organized as they
are, nor did they expect this level of Shiite opposition to a
U.S. occupation. In other words, the strategic understanding of
the Iraqi campaign took its bearings from the Afghan campaign –
and the United States had no interest in pacification — but at
the same time, the United States did not expect this level of
difficulty and danger involved in pacifying Iraq, because U.S.
intelligence misread the situation on the ground.
At its current level of operations, the guerrilla war does not
represent a military challenge to the United States. Therefore,
the first and third goals are for the moment achieved. The United
States has displaced the Iraqi regime, limiting its ability to
engage in strategic operations with the United States, and U.S.
forces can conduct follow-on operations should they choose to.
But the United States is in serious danger of failing to achieve
its second goal: transforming the psychological perception of the
United States as an irresistible military force.
It certainly is true that the guerrilla war does not represent a
strategic threat to the United States. But on one level, the
reality is irrelevant. Perception is everything. The image that
the U.S. Army is constantly taking casualties and is unable to
cripple the guerrillas undermines the perception that the United
States wanted to generate with this war. The reality might be
that the United States is overwhelmingly powerful and the
guerrilla war is a minor nuisance. The perception in the Islamic
world will be that the United States does not have the power to
suppress Saddam Hussein’s guerrillas. It will complicate the
politico-military process that the United States wanted to put
into motion with the invasion. It is therefore a situation that
the United States will have to deal with.
The United States has, in essence, two strategic options:
1. Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while
allowing the political situation on the ground to play itself
out. Allow the tension between Shiite and Sunni to explode into
civil war, manipulating each side to the U.S. advantage, while
focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria, Iran and
elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the
Iraqi reality, and carry on operations elsewhere.
2. Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through
counterinsurgency operations, including direct military attacks
and political operations.
The dilemma facing the United States is this: From a strictly
military perspective, Option 1 is most attractive. From a
political and psychological perspective, Option 1 is
unacceptable. It also creates a military risk: The insurgency,
unless checked, ultimately could threaten the security of U.S.
forces in Iraq no matter how well-defended they were in their
secure facilities. On the other side of the equation,
counterinsurgency operations always require disproportionate
resources. The number of insurgents is unimportant. The number of
places they might be and the number of locations they might
attack dictate the amount of resources that must be devoted to
them. Therefore, a relatively small group of guerrillas can tie
down a much larger force. A sparse, dispersed and autonomous
guerrilla force can draw off sufficient forces to make follow-on
operations impossible.
The classical counterinsurgency dilemma now confronts the United
States. The quantity of forces needed to defeat the guerrillas is
disproportionate to the military advantage gained by defeating
them. Failure to engage the guerrilla force could result in a
dramatic upsurge in their numbers, allowing them to become
unmanageable. The ineffective engagement of guerrillas could
result in both the squandering of resources and the failure to
contain them. The issue is not how large the guerrilla force is
but how sustainable it is. At this stage of operations, the
smaller the force the more difficult it is to suppress — so long
as it is large enough to carry out dispersed operations, has
sufficient supplies and the ability to recruit new members as
needed. At this point, the Iraqi guerrilla force is of
indeterminate size, but it is certainly well-dispersed and has
sufficient supplies to operate. Its ability to recruit will
depend on arrangements made prior to the U.S. occupation and the
evolution of the conflict. This sort of guerrilla warfare does
not provide readily satisfactory solutions for the occupying
power.
The classic solution of a guerrilla threat to an occupying power
is to transfer the burden of fighting to an indigenous force. Not
accidentally, the Iraqi guerrillas in recent days attacked and
killed seven Iraqis being trained for this role. Inventing a
counterinsurgency force beyond your own forces in the midst of
conflict is not easy. Nevertheless, successful containment of a
guerrilla force must involve either an indigenous force motivated
to suppress the guerrillas or, alternatively, forces provided by
a faction hostile to the guerrilla faction — an ethnic or
religious group that shares the occupier’s interest in
suppressing the guerrillas.
The greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the
guerrillas. It is the guerrillas combined with a rising among the
Shiites south of Baghdad. If the guerrilla rising combines with
an intifada — a mass rising that might not use weapons beyond
stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S. controls in
the south — it would represent a most untenable situation. An
intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate
logistics. Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from
the south. Suppressing an intifada not only is difficult, it has
political and psychological consequences as well.
It is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among
the Shiites. It is also imperative that the United States find a
native faction in Iraq that is prepared to take on some of the
burden of suppressing the primarily Baathist guerrillas. The
United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but could use the
Shiites in suppressing the Baathists. The Shiites are the center
of gravity of the situation.
Shiite leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any
new Iraqi government — and that they expect the United States to
create such a government. The United States has been concerned
that Iran influences and even might control the Shiites and that
handing over power to the Iraqi Shiites would, in effect, make
Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately in the Persian
Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the core
U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce
Iran. To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen
Iran makes little sense. On the other hand, if the United States
continues to refuse to create a native government in Iraq, the
probability of a Shiite rising is substantial.
The key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If
regime change in Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial
accommodation with the Iranian government could be negotiated,
then using the Iraqi Shiites to man an Iraqi government and bear
the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation would be practical.
The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides the
United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian
government would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide
support to al Qaeda.
The regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the
Sunnis for the Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply
sectarian religious violence is rooted in the Islamic world. The
United States cannot supplant Islamic fundamentalism. It can
potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to control the
direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United
States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and
nuclear weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution
rather than a problem.
If there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must
demonstrate to Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability
to destabilize the Islamic Republic, and second that it is
prepared not to do so in return for Shiite cooperation. Without
this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would spiral out
of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key
for the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in
Iran. The United States does not want to overthrow the Iranian
government. It simply wants to demonstrate its ability to
destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that, then other
things become possible.
It follows that the United States likely shortly will work to
reignite the demonstrations in Iran — in all probability in the
next few days. The purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian
government — that is beyond U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will
be designed to persuade Iranian leaders — including Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — that some form of cooperation
with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans
is in their interest, and could result in something that the
Iranians have longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq.
This strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with
difficulties. But the prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency
campaign in Iraq, alone, without indigenous support, is equally
fraught with danger. So too is attempting an Afghan solution –
packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing the
insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the
moment. Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and
risky, but the other choices are equally difficult. If the
Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will be time to choose between
counterinsurgency and enclaves.
………………………………………………………….
STRATFOR SERVICES NOW AVAILABLE:
Join decision-makers around the world who read Stratfor for daily
intelligence briefs, in-depth analyses and forecasts on a wide
range of international security, political and economic affairs.
Stratfor Premium is our flagship product providing comprehensive
global intelligence including daily analyses, special reports,
intelligence alerts, premium analyses, situation reports, country
and regional net assessments as well as Stratfor’s sought after
Annual and Quarterly Forecasts. Corporate or multi-user volume
discount packages available. Visit this web page for details.
Stratfor Basic offers daily analysis, situation reports and ongoing
coverage of global events. Also available with this package is a
pay per view service for many of our premium reports. Visit this web
page for details.
………………………………………………………….
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Product inquiries, partnership, and sales: marketing@stratfor.com
Subscription and customer service issues: service@stratfor.com
Comments and/or information for analysis: analysis@stratfor.com
Media services and trade show requests: PR@stratfor.com
………………………………………………………….
Stratfor.com
====================================================================
(c) 2003 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
