Dr. Colin Campbell on Peak Oil
Folks,
Here are a couple more resources on
Peak Oil that I strongly encourage you to check out. If you’ve read the articles
on Peak Oil that I’ve sent around previously, you will recognize Dr. Campbell’s
name, and much of this material. But these resources really bring the problem
into focus in a less academic and more accessible way.
Peak Oil that I strongly encourage you to check out. If you’ve read the articles
on Peak Oil that I’ve sent around previously, you will recognize Dr. Campbell’s
name, and much of this material. But these resources really bring the problem
into focus in a less academic and more accessible way.
Here are some video excerpts of an
interview with Dr. Campbell from December 18, 2002, along with transcripts.
These excerpts are easily digested, especially if the previous articles were too
daunting:
interview with Dr. Campbell from December 18, 2002, along with transcripts.
These excerpts are easily digested, especially if the previous articles were too
daunting:
Here is an updated paper by Dr.
Campbell from April 2001, for the M King Hubbert Center for Petroleum
Supply Studies at the Colorado School of Mines, presenting the critical material
in only 7 pages:
Campbell from April 2001, for the M King Hubbert Center for Petroleum
Supply Studies at the Colorado School of Mines, presenting the critical material
in only 7 pages:
Peak Oil: A Turning Point for
Mankind
Mankind
Finally, for those of you who enjoy
something a little more literary and academic, this article is interesting, and
highlights how the Peak Oil problem is at root of the Bush administration’s
foreign and domestic policies:
something a little more literary and academic, this article is interesting, and
highlights how the Peak Oil problem is at root of the Bush administration’s
foreign and domestic policies:
Spengler really
understands
By Joe Nichols
understands
By Joe Nichols
Here’s a worthy excerpt:
“This was nicely
demonstrated in a recent article by Gabriel Kolko, a leading military
historian[...] Noting that “the state’s intelligence mechanisms are constrained
by a larger structural and ideological environment which foredooms any effort to
base action on informed insight to a chimera”, and that “The political and
ideological imperatives and interests define the nature of ‘relevant’ truths,”
Kolko equates this tendency with the “US’s failed confrontation with the Islamic
world for over half a century” and places particular emphasis on the morass in
Iraq today. His conclusion: “To expect the US to behave other than as it has is
to cultivate serious illusions and delude oneself. The system, in a word, is
irrational. We saw it in Vietnam and we are seeing it today in Iraq.”
demonstrated in a recent article by Gabriel Kolko, a leading military
historian[...] Noting that “the state’s intelligence mechanisms are constrained
by a larger structural and ideological environment which foredooms any effort to
base action on informed insight to a chimera”, and that “The political and
ideological imperatives and interests define the nature of ‘relevant’ truths,”
Kolko equates this tendency with the “US’s failed confrontation with the Islamic
world for over half a century” and places particular emphasis on the morass in
Iraq today. His conclusion: “To expect the US to behave other than as it has is
to cultivate serious illusions and delude oneself. The system, in a word, is
irrational. We saw it in Vietnam and we are seeing it today in Iraq.”
In plainer language: we invaded
Iraq because we absolutely must have control of the Middle East and its fossil
fuels before the shit really hits the fan.
Iraq because we absolutely must have control of the Middle East and its fossil
fuels before the shit really hits the fan.
This seems like a good time to review
Paul Krugman’s “Rules of reporting” for concerned citizens who are trying to
understand the news (from his book The Great Unraveling):
Paul Krugman’s “Rules of reporting” for concerned citizens who are trying to
understand the news (from his book The Great Unraveling):
1. Don’t assume that policy proposals
make sense in terms of their stated goals.
make sense in terms of their stated goals.
2. Do some homework to discover the
real goals.
real goals.
3. Don’t assume that the usual rules
of politics apply.
of politics apply.
4. Expect a revolutionary power to
respond to criticism by attacking.
respond to criticism by attacking.
5. Don’t think that there’s a limit
to a revolutionary power’s objectives.
to a revolutionary power’s objectives.
Let’s give Dr. Campbell the final
word:
word:
“All of this is so incredibly obvious, being
clearly revealed by even the simplest analysis of discovery and production
trends. The inexplicable part is our great reluctance to look reality in the
face and at least make some plans for what promises to be one of the greatest
economic and political discontinuities of all time. Time is of the essence. It
is later than you think.”
–C
clearly revealed by even the simplest analysis of discovery and production
trends. The inexplicable part is our great reluctance to look reality in the
face and at least make some plans for what promises to be one of the greatest
economic and political discontinuities of all time. Time is of the essence. It
is later than you think.”
–C